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Towards an emotional ‘stress test’: 
a reliable, non-subjective cognitive 
measure of anxious responding
Jessica Aylward & Oliver J. Robinson
Response to stress or external threats is a key factor in mood and anxiety disorder aetiology. Current 
measures of anxious responding to threats are limited because they largely rely on retrospective 
self-report. Objectively quantifying individual differences in threat response would be a valuable step 
towards improving our understanding of anxiety disorder vulnerability. Our goal is to therefore develop 
a reliable, objective, within-subject ‘stress-test’ of anxious responding. To this end, we examined 
threat-potentiated performance on an inhibitory control task from baseline to 2–4 weeks (n = 50) 
and again after 5–9 months (n = 22). We also describe single session data for a larger sample (n = 157) 
to provide better population-level estimates of task performance variance. Replicating previous 
findings, threat of shock improved distractor accuracy and slowed target reaction time on our task. 
Critically, both within-subject self-report measures of anxiety (ICC = 0.66) and threat-potentiated 
task performance (ICC = 0.58) showed clinically useful test-retest reliability. Threat-potentiated task 
performance may therefore hold promise as a non-subjective measure of individual anxious responding.
Mood disorders are common, but there is huge variability in vulnerability1. According to the diathesis–stress 
model2, a disorder is triggered when an underlying vulnerability, coupled with stressful life events reaches a 
threshold. This suggests that a clear ability to quantify mood and anxiety disorder vulnerability will not emerge 
without an ability to quantify individual differences in anxious responding or sensitivity to threat.
Subjective ratings of self-reported anxiety levels can be increased experimentally using threat of unpredictable 
shock. In this paradigm, unpredictable electric shocks are delivered to the wrist, independent of task perfor-
mance. This manipulation engages similar circuitry as pathological anxiety3. ‘Threat-potentiated’ responding can 
then be determined by comparing performance in the same individual when they are at risk and safe from shock. 
Many domains of cognition are affected (for a review see ref. 4) including inhibitory control5 and attentional bias 
towards threat6.
The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), where participants respond to frequent target stimuli 
whilst withholding a response to infrequent distractor stimuli (under alternating threat and safe conditions where 
at risk and safe from shock, respectively), can explore the interaction between threat-potentiated responding 
and inhibitory control. There is strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the impact of induced anxiety 
on this task (which can be maladaptive or adaptive depending on the context) is a consequence of facilitated 
motor response inhibition5. The impact of threat of shock on accuracy has been confirmed in numerous studies, 
improving accuracy to distractor stimuli5 and impairing accuracy to target stimuli7, but its test-retest reliability 
is unknown. The impact on reaction time is less clear; in some cases there are no effects5,8 whilst in a modi-
fied version of the SART an increase in reaction time was evidenced (see preprint and data doi:10.7287/PEERJ.
PREPRINTS.1542V1).
In the cardiac ‘stress-test’, subjecting the heart to the stress of exercise reveals key diagnostic signatures of heart 
disease vulnerability that are not evident at rest9. Here we seek to develop an emotional analogue of this ‘stress 
test’. In order to have clinical value, test performance needs to meet certain assumptions, for example; good valid-
ity, the degree to which a test accurately measures what it is intended to measure, and (as we are probing here), it 
should be reliable and stable across time in the same individuals10. Many cognitive tasks, nevertheless, show poor 
reliability (see Table 1).
We therefore probed the test-retest reliability of threat-potentiated responding on the SART using Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficients11. We predicted that threat of shock would improve accuracy at withholding a response 
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to distractor stimuli, in line with previous findings. Critically, we predicted that this would be reliable across 
testing sessions and hence constitute a non-subjective, behavioural measure of individual anxious responding: an 
emotional equivalent of the cardiac ‘stress test’. In order to provide a more accurate estimation of the population 
level mean and variance – critical prior to any clinical application – we also analysed data from a larger, hetero-
geneous sample (N = 157).
Results
Test-retest reliability analyses were run on the individual measures across two and three testing sessions (See 
Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively).
Accuracy to “no go” stimuli. A repeated measures ANOVA including condition and session revealed a 
main effect of condition (F(1,49) = 9.11, p = 0.004, ηp
2 = 0.157) (Fig. 1a,b). Participants were significantly more 
accurate under threat of shock (threat mean = 0.685, SD = 0.20; safe mean = 0.641, SD = 0.18). There was no main 
effect of session or a significant threat x session interaction (p = 0.93, p = 0.063, respectively). The reliability of 
threat induced accuracy changes across 2 sessions had a non-significant ICC of 0.23 (F(49,49) = 1.31, p = 0.17, 95% 
CI − 0.32, 0.55) but across 3 sessions, the effect of threat on accuracy was significant and “fair to good”, with an 
ICC of 0.51 (F(21,42) = 2.02, p = 0.026, 95% CI − 0.0026, 0.78).
For those participants who completed two sessions only, the reliability of threat induced accuracy had a 
non-significant ICC of 0.31 (F(27,27) = 1.49, p = 0.15, 95% CI − 0.38, 0.67).
Reaction time to “go” stimuli. A repeated measures ANOVA including condition and session revealed a 
significant effect of condition (F(1,49) = 6.75, p = 0.012, ηp
2 = 0.121) (Fig. 1c,d). Participants were slower to respond 
during the threat condition relative to the safe condition (threat mean = 365.40, SD = 64.71; safe mean = 355.44, 
SD = 56.73). There was no effect of session, nor a session x condition interaction (ps > 0.250). Reliability for the 
effect of threat of shock across 2 sessions was significant and “fair to good” with an ICC of 0.58 (F(49,49) = 2.38, 
p = 0.0015, 95% CI 0.26, 0.76) and remained “fair to good” across 3 sessions with an ICC of 0.50 (F(21,42) = 1.99, 
p = 0.029, 95% CI − 0.017, 0.78).
For those participants who completed two sessions only, the effect of induced anxiety on reaction time was 
non-significant, with an ICC of 0.42 (F(27,27) = 1.73, p = 0.08, 95% CI − 0.25, 0.73).
Anxiety Rating. Participants were more anxious during the threat condition relative to the safe condition 
(F(1,49) = 225.96, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.82)(Fig. 1e,f). There was no main effect of session or a significant session x con-
dition interaction (p = 0.75, p = 0.089, respectively). The reliability of this effect was “fair to good” across 2 ses-
sions with an ICC of 0.66 (F(49,49) = 3.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.41, 0.81) and “excellent” across 3 sessions with an 
ICC of 0.75 (F(20,40) = 3.90, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.48, 0.89).
For those participants who completed two sessions only, the reliability of this effect was “excellent” with an 
ICC of 0.77 (F(27,27) = 4.20, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.49, 0.89).
Shock Level. Shock level was significantly higher in the second session (F(1,49) = 9.62, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.164; 
session 1 mean = 6.22, SD = 2.89; session 2 mean = 7.10, SD = 2.79)(Fig. 1g).
Reliability for shock level over 2 sessions was significant, with an “excellent”, with an ICC of 0.84 (F(49,49) = 7.05, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.68, 0.91) and reliable across 3 sessions with an “excellent” ICC of 0.93 (F(21,42) = 16.20, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI, 0.85, 0.97).
For those participants who completed two sessions only, the reliability for shock level was “excellent” with an 
ICC of 0.80 (F(27,27) = 5.24, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.56, 0.91).
Trait Anxiety. Trait anxiety scores were also analysed as a comparison. There was no significant change over 
session (p = 0.622) (Fig. 1h). The reliability of the trait anxiety score was “excellent”, with an ICC of 0.95 across 
2 sessions (F(49,49) = 20.97, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.92, 0.97) and across 3 sessions with an “excellent” ICC of 0.94 
(F(21,42) = 16.67, p < 0.001, 95% CI, 0.87, 0.97).
For those participants who completed two sessions only, the reliability for trait anxiety was significant, with an 
“excellent” ICC of 0.96 across 2 sessions (F(27,27) = 26.40, p < 0.001, 95% CI 0.92, 0.98).
Emotional Task
Test-retest 
reliability Type of reliability measure Reference
Emotional Stroop
− 0.17 (Anxiety - Neutral) ‘Reliability coefficient’ 26
0.29 (Standard Stroop interference) Pearson’s r 12
Dot probe
− 0.04 (Self-relevant positive words) ‘Reliability coefficient’ 27
0.04 (Social threat words) ‘Reliability coefficient’ 28
0.13 (Negative unmasked) Two way mixed ICC 13
Table 1.  Commonly used emotional tasks and their test-retest reliabilities.  Note that for the reliability 
coefficients/Pearsons’s r: 0.7 is strong, 0.5 is moderate and 0.3 is weak reliability. For the ICCs, 0.4–0.75 is ‘fair to 
good’ reliability and > 0.75 is ‘excellent’ reliability.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
3Scientific RepoRts | 7:40094 | DOI: 10.1038/srep40094
Population variance. Threat potentiated accuracy to no-go stimuli (threat minus safe accuracy at correctly 
withholding a response to distractor stimuli), in 157 subjects revealed increased a population mean of 0.072, 
median of 0.05, a standard deviation of 0.15 (See Fig. 1,i).
Discussion
We show that threat of shock can reliably shift within-subject cognitive and self-report measures of anxious 
responding across three sessions and three quarters of a year, improving accuracy to distractor stimuli and slow-
ing down responses to target stimuli. This improvement in accuracy replicates previous studies5,8 and an increase 
in reaction time under threat of shock replicates a line of previous research (see preprint and data*).
Importantly, threat-potentiated performance on this task also shows good within-subject reliability over 2–4 
weeks in the full sample and again over a 5–9 months. For reference, this means that the emotional manipulation 
(i.e. threat of shock) on this task, is considerably more reliable than the emotional manipulation (i.e. emotional 
stimuli) on the emotional Stroop and dot probe tasks12,13(see Table 1).
We note that there is imprecision surrounding the term, ‘stress’, which is used to describe the prolonged HPA 
axis response or psychological experiences (of which there is a perception of a mechanistic link14,15). Considering 
the time course of the glucocorticoid response and our manipulation, it is unlikely this link would be observed 
using the present design. We regard our findings as indicative of anxious responding and use the term, ‘stress test’, 
because our goals align with those of the cardiac ‘stress test’. ‘Stress tests’ are of great value in cardiac medicine as 
Individual measures of interest ICC value Repeated measures ANOVA
Accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across safe conditions 0.82* F(49,49) = 5.71
Accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across threat conditions 0.87* F(49,49) = 7.58
Difference in accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across conditions 0.23 F(49,49) = 1.31
Reaction time to “go” stimuli across safe conditions 0.82* F(49,49) = 5.40
Reaction time to “go” stimuli across threat conditions 0.91* F(49,49) = 11.14
Difference in reaction time to “go” stimuli across conditions. 0.58* F(49,49) = 2.37
Self-report anxiety level across safe conditions 0.63* F(49,49) = 2.78
Self-report anxiety level across threat conditions 0.62* F(49,49) = 2.59
Difference in self-report anxiety level across conditions 0.66* F(49,49) = 3.05
Table 2.  Full sample reliability of measures across two testing sessions (N = 50). *p < 0.05.
Individual measures of interest ICC value Repeated measures ANOVA
Accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across safe conditions 0.86* F(27,27) = 7.39
Accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across threat conditions 0.85* F(27,27) = 6.85
Difference in accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across conditions 0.31 F(27,27) = 1.31
Reaction time to “go” stimuli across safe conditions 0.68* F(27,27) = 3.21
Reaction time to “go” stimuli across threat conditions 0.82* F(27,27) = 5.61
Difference in reaction time to “go” stimuli across conditions. 0.42 F(27,27) = 1.73
Self-report anxiety level across safe conditions 0.63* F(27,27) = 2.73
Self-report anxiety level across threat conditions 0.75* F(27,27) = 3.94
Difference in self-report anxiety level across conditions 0.77* F(27,27) = 4.20
Table 3.  Reliability of measures across participants who completed two testing sessions only (N = 28). 
*p < 0.05.
Individual measures of interest ICC value Repeated measures ANOVA
Accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across safe conditions 0.80* F(21,42) = 4.94
Accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across threat conditions 0.91* F(21,42) = 11.87
Difference in accuracy to “no-go” stimuli across conditions 0.51* F(21,42) = 2.02
Reaction time to “go” stimuli across safe conditions. 0.88* F(21,42) = 9.21
Reaction time to “go” stimuli across threat conditions. 0.93* F(21,42) = 16.53
Difference in reaction time to “go” stimuli across conditions. 0.50* F(21,42) = 1.99
Self-report anxiety level across safe conditions 0.83* F(20,40) = 6.84
Self-report anxiety level across threat conditions 0.60* F(20,40) = 2.58
Difference in self-report anxiety level across conditions 0.75* F(20,40) = 3.90
Table 4.  Reliability of measures across participants who completed three testing sessions (N = 22). 
*p < 0.05.
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Figure 1. Violin plots (shaded area represents a histogram) (a). Accuracy to “no go” stimuli across threat and 
safe conditions. There was a main effect of condition (p = 0.04). (b) Delta accuracy (inset across three sessions). 
(c) Reaction time to “go” stimuli across threat and safe conditions. There was a main effect of condition 
(p = 0.012). (d) Delta reaction time (inset across 3 sessions). (e) Anxiety rating across threat and safe  
conditions. There was a main effect of condition (p < 0.05). (f) Delta anxiety ratings (inset across three  
conditions). (g) Shock level across baseline and follow up (main effect of session p = 0.003; inset shock level 
across three sessions). (h) Trait anxiety score across testing sessions (inset trait anxiety across three sessions).  
(i) Distribution of delta distractor accuracy scores on the SART in a large population (N = 157). Dotted line at 
zero demonstrates population as a whole shifted towards threat-potentiated accuracy.
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they are able to identify patients who may be more vulnerable and need closer monitoring around surgery, which 
in turn leads to improved outcomes16.
Prior work has shown that participants with clinical anxiety showed impaired “go” accuracy overall compared 
to controls on this, suggesting that there is an overactive adaptive defensive mechanism in clinical anxiety17. 
Consequently, we suggest that the effect of threat on reaction time observed here could be a reflection of this 
behavioural inhibition. The impact of induced anxiety on response inhibition could therefore be a behavioural 
marker for clinical anxiety so, given the reliability of this task, we believe is has clinical potential.
According to the diathesis model of anxiety disorders, when stressful life events are coupled with an underly-
ing vulnerability and a threshold is reached, a disorder is triggered. Understanding individual responses to stress 
is therefore key to understanding the differences in vulnerability to anxiety disorders. Pathological feelings of 
anxiety contribute to the most common psychiatric disorders, and it is suggested that over the next 20 years these 
rates will continue to rise18. Identifying vulnerability prior to disorder onset with a non-subjective cognitive task 
could consequently lower costs and reduce time in treatment. Additionally, cognitive paradigms which show 
good reliability are important for research, impacting replicability and the accurate interpretation of existing 
findings19.
It should be noted that self-report trait anxiety also has a high ICC in this study. However, interpretation of 
this is limited due to anchoring effects20 and demand characteristics21. Our task is not obviously subject to these 
effects and also benefits from being a concurrent (i.e. not retrospective) measure. The poorer test-retest reliability 
on our accuracy delta variable for the two to four week follow up may be due to a reduction in power resulting 
from the smaller number of no-go responses, and suggests that go reaction time differences may prove the more 
reliable target. It is also worth noting that we see poorer test-retest reliability in the sub-sample who only com-
pleted two sessions (Table 3). The reasons for this are unclear, but may be driven by self-selection bias in individ-
uals unwilling or unable to return for a third testing session. Of course, this sample is also underpowered per our 
power calculation so inference should be approached with caution.
In summary, we argue that the impact of threat of shock on cognition might hold promise as a putative probe 
of threat sensitivity, and a phenotype of anxious responding.
Method
Fifty healthy participants (25 female, mean age = 26.5, SD = 8.47), completed the SART in two testing sessions, 
separated by a period of between two and four weeks. Twenty two participants (11 female, mean age = 28.5, 
SD = 11.00) completed the task for the third time in a follow up session between five and nine months later. A 
screening procedure prior to participation verified that participants had no history of neurological, psychiatric, 
or cardiovascular conditions. Exclusion criteria also included alcohol dependence and any recreational drug use 
in the last 4 weeks.
The methods were identical on each session. Participants provided written informed consent to take part in 
the study (UCL ethics reference: 1764/001). Prior to participation, subjects were screened to ensure that they had 
no history of neurological, psychiatric, or cardiovascular conditions. All methods were carried out in accordance 
with relevant guidelines and regulations and all protocols were approved by UCL ethics committee (reference 
1764/001).
An a priori power analysis was run in G*Power22. The power analysis was based on previous results of the 
SART5 that gave an effect size of 0.56 for the effect of threat of shock on response accuracy to “no-go” distractor 
stimuli. We wanted 95% power (with alpha 0.05, two tailed) to detect an effect size of 0.56. A power calculation 
determined that we needed 46 participants. We recruited an extra 4 to allow for ~8% participant drop-off. This 
sample size also has 99% power to detect a reliability of at least 0.5 (a minimum value we consider acceptable for 
clinical relevance) at alpha = 0.05 (one-tailed). For the final 5–9 month follow up we showed considerable (56%) 
drop-off. A post hoc matched t-test power analysis showed that with 22 participants (with alpha = 0.05, two 
tailed) we had only 70.96% power to detect an effect of this magnitude. Notably, however, this still has 83% power 
to detect a reliability of at least 0.5 (a minimum value we consider acceptable for clinical relevance) at alpha = 0.05 
(one-tailed). As such, this three-session analysis is powered for reliability analysis only. Given that 3 session and 
full 2 session samples overlap, we also include a separate 2 session analysis on those who only attended twice for 
completeness.
Anxiety manipulation. Two electrodes were attached to the back of the participants’ non-dominant wrist. 
A Digitimer DS5 Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer Ltd., Welwyn Garden City, UK) delivered the shocks. 
A short shock-level work up increased the level of the shock until the subject rated it as “unpleasant, but not 
painful”23. As in previous versions of this task5 during a threat block, in which the background was red, the 
participants were told they were at risk of an unpredictable shock (which was independent of their behavioural 
response). When in a safe block, the background was blue (and participants were told that no shocks would be 
delivered). Colours were not counterbalanced as prior work has shown this effect to be independent of back-
ground colour24,25. After completing the task, participants provided retrospective subjective anxiety ratings for the 
threat and safe conditions. This manipulation check is consistent with current clinical diagnoses (i.e. self-report 
of symptoms) and is used by many other researchers in the field (for a review see ref. 4).
Task structure. Participants completed a previously used task5 recoded using the Cogent (Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK) toolbox for Matlab (2014b, 
The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, United States). Participants were instructed to respond to “go” target stimuli 
(“= ”) by pressing the space bar as quickly as possible, and withhold a response to “no go” target stimuli (“O”). 
They were instructed to make their response using their dominant hand.
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47 “go” stimuli and 5 “no-go” stimuli were presented in each block. The stimuli were presented for 250 ms, 
followed by an interstimulus interval of 1750 ms, before presentation of the next stimulus. There were 8 blocks 
in total, alternating between threat and safe blocks (order counterbalanced). Each block lasted 104 seconds (See 
Fig. 2). For 3 seconds at the beginning of each block, “YOU ARE NOW SAFE FROM SHOCK!” or “YOU ARE 
NOW AT RISK OF SHOCK!” appeared on the screen. Participants received a shock in the first threat block, 
(after trial 45), the second threat block (after trial 8), and the fourth threat block (after trial 17). Total task dura-
tion was approximately 14 minutes and 30 seconds (task script available online: https://figshare.com/articles/
SART_script/3443093).
Wider sample. Threat-potentiated task performance data from a larger (n = 157) heterogeneous sample col-
lected across UCL, UK and NIH, USA are also presented to explore population level statistics.
Statistical Analyses. Reaction time and accuracy data (data available online: https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/
m9.figshare.3398764.v1) were analysed using repeated-measures general linear models in SPSS version 22 (IBM 
Crop, Armonk, NY). For all analyses, p = 0.05, was considered significant. Performance accuracy for each con-
dition (threat/safe) and trial type (“go”/“no-go”) was calculated by dividing the number of correct trials by the 
total number of trials. As “go” accuracy was 97.5% across two sessions, only “no-go” trials were included in the 
accuracy analysis. Reaction time analysis was performed on “go” stimuli only as, by definition, “no-go” reaction 
times are limited and restricted to error trials.
For the first two fully powered sessions, repeated measures ANOVAs were run to investigate reaction time and 
accuracy differences across conditions. Due to lack of power resulting from attrition (see above) these were not 
run for the third session.
Task reliability over two and three sessions was tested using two-way mixed model ICCs run in Matlab 
(2014b) using an “Intraclass Correlation Coefficient” script (http://uk.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexcha
nge/22099-intraclass-correlation-coefficient–icc-). This determined whether the influence of threat of shock on 
various performance measures remained consistent in individuals between testing sessions. In accordance with11 
an ICC coefficient was considered ‘fair to good’ if between 0.4 and 0.75, and ‘excellent’ if above 0.75. In our power 
calculation we deemed 0.5 the minimum reliability required for clinical relevance. Reliability analyses were com-
pleted on the critical delta variables (the difference between threat and safe condition for that variable) to look 
at the reliability of the threat-potentiated effect for reaction time, accuracy and shock rating. Analyses were also 
run for shock level and trait anxiety scores (for which there are only one measurement per session, so no deltas). 
Estimates for each condition separately demonstrating the reliability of the individual measures themselves are 
presented in Table 2, 3 and 4.
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